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SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS AND NEPA: 
MITIGATING ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES 
WITH CONSENT DECREES 
John V. Cardone-
I. INTRODUCTION 
When Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA),l it established a policy of promoting the welfare of future 
generations by taking steps to insure that humans and nature exist 
in productive harmony.2 NEP A broadly states that the federal gov-
ernment shall use all practicable means at its disposal to achieve a 
goal of environmental harmony within the limits of other essential 
national considerations. 3 Congress recognized that activities aimed 
at raising the standard ofliving in a society often come at the expense 
of environmental harm.4 Given this reality, the goal of NEPA is to 
ensure that the federal government adequately considers the envi-
ronmental consequences of its actions. 5 
In furtherance of its environmental goal, NEPA requires all fed-
eral agencies proposing an action that "significantly affect[s] the 
quality of the human environment" to submit an environmental im-
pact statement (EIS).6 The EIS must include a discussion of the 
environmental impacts of the proposed action, alternatives to the 
action, and any commitment of resources necessary for the action's 
• Production Editor, 1990-1991, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-
VIEW. 
1 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1982). 
2 [d. § 4321. 
3 [d. § 4331(b). 
4 [d. § 4331(a). "[The inadequacy of present environmental policies] threatens, ... degrades 
and destroys the quality of life which all [persons] seek." 115 CONGo REC. 40,417 (1969) 
(statement of Sen. Jackson upon presentation of the NEPA conference report). 
5 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). 
6 [d. 
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implementation. 7 EIS reporting ensures that an agency discloses all 
information used in making a decision, and that the general public 
has an opportunity to comment on the proposal. 
During the reporting process, environmental groups and con-
cerned citizens learn of the impact an action will have on the envi-
ronment and often marshal opposition to the proposed action. Parties 
opposed to the project attempt to show that the agency has not 
adequately considered its proposal in light of resulting detrimental 
environmental effects. They challenge the scope of an EIS and the 
sufficiency of its analysis of environmental harms. 8 
By attacking an EIS, plaintiffs attempt to appeal to public senti-
ment and to make agencies more responsive to substantive environ-
mental concerns. 9 Such litigation only has reinforced one judicial 
tenet: NEP A does not establish substantive environmental stan-
dards. 10 NEP A states only the minimum procedural requirements 
an agency must follow in collecting, evaluating, and disclosing infor-
mation on a proposed action. Through these requirements NEPA 
helps to ensure that the agency makes an informed decision. 11 Be-
cause NEPA states only procedural requirements to disclose con-
sequences and not substantive standards to weigh them, NEPA does 
not provide grounds for challenging an agency's action merely be-
cause of resulting environmental harm. 
This Comment suggests that environmentalists could seek a con-
sent decree, in conjunction with the EIS reporting process, to make 
agencies and third parties more responsive to substantive environ-
mental concerns, and to provide grounds for a cause of action when 
guarding against environmental harm. Section II discusses the cur-
rent limited scope of judicial review over NEPA and the inability of 
plaintiffs to gain a judgment that would do more than temporarily 
7 Id. 
B See Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dures (SCRAP), 422 U.S. 289, 319 (1975) (NEPA creates a right of action in adversely affected 
parties to require agencies to give written consideration of environmental issues). 
9 See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 
90 (1983) (respondents challenged assumption by Nuclear Regulatory Commission that per-
manent storage of nuclear waste would not have a significant environmental impact for 
purposes of NEPA); Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) 
(respondents challenged a determination by the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment that redesignation of a building site from mixed housing to exclusively low-income 
housing was environmentally acceptable under NEP A). 
10 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 
519, 558 (1978). 
II Id. 
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forestall detrimental environmental consequences. 12 Section III ex-
amines the use of consent decrees as tools in providing a more flexible 
judgment in litigation. A consent decree allows a court to grant relief 
under a statute that may be beyond the court's power if it acted 
alone, and such a decree allows for better enforcement of a judg-
ment. 13 
Section IV examines the possibility that the preclusion of detri-
mental environmental effects may be the appropriate subject matter 
for a consent decree. 14 If such a decree is issued, the agency must 
identify those detrimental effects that cannot be precluded and dis-
cuss how they can be mitigated if the project is implemented. 15 
Finally, section V examines a hypothetical situation, based upon 
a recent Supreme Court decision, that illustrates how parties could 
use a consent decree to preclude the occurrence of some adverse 
effects. 16 This analysis also will show that the decree could enhance 
the NEP A disclosure function, by establishing supplemental report-
ing to environmentalists on agency activities. In this way, the decree 
could provide environmentalists with a better means of enforcing 
compliance with an EIS.17 
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER NEPA 
Judicial review of an agency's decisions under NEPA is governed 
by the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).18 Under the APA,19 a 
reviewing court will hold an agency action unlawful if it is found to 
be arbitrary or capricious. 20 A court also may enjoin an action if the 
agency did not follow procedures prescribed by law.21 Courts will 
give greater deference to an agency, however, when the agency has 
12 See infra notes 18-36 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 37-95 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 96-121 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 122-140 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 141-167 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 168-190 and accompanying text. 
18 Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. Environmental Protection Agency, 684 F.2d 
1041, 1045 (1st Cir. 1982) (quoting Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068, 1072 
(1st Cir. 1980». See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). 
19 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988). 
20 Id. § 706(2)(A); cf. City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 552 F.2d 736, 737 
(7th Cir. 1977) (EIS held adequate when EPA's decision to approve of project was not arbitrary 
or capricious). 
21 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (1988); see Citizens for Responsible Area Growth v. Adams, 477 F. 
Supp. 994, 1006-07 (D. N.H. 1979) (court enjoined airport construction pending completion of 
an EIS). 
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interpreted complex scientific or technical data to resolve an issue 
of fact. 22 
The APA's arbitrary or capricious standard, combined with the 
courts' deference to agencies on matters of scientific fact, limits 
judicial review under NEPA.23 An environmental group attempting 
to stop a project has the burden of convincing the court that the 
agency acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably in compiling 
the EIS.24 In certain circumstances, courts also have prevented an 
agency from acting because the agency failed to follow required EIS 
procedures.25 If an EIS adequately discloses the consequences of the 
project, however, a court will not second-guess the agency's decision 
to proceed. 26 
Courts rarely review agencies' post-project compliance with an 
EIS.27 In many cases when plaintiffs have sought judicial review of 
whether an agency complied with an EIS in implementing a project, 
the courts have stated that plaintiffs should have brought their suit 
while the project was under way, not after the damage was done. 28 
As a result, some courts have declared cases moot because plaintiffs 
failed to halt a project while it was in progress.29 Once a project is 
22 See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103 
(1983) ("When examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to simple findings 
of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential."); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 
427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976) ("Resolving ... [the issues in question] requires a high level of 
technical expertise and is properly left to the informed discretion of the responsible federal 
agencies."). 
23 See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 109 S. Ct. 1851, 1861 (1989). 
24 Section 706 of the AP A requires a reviewing court to "hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). While unreasonableness is 
not used in the APA, it has been equated with the arbitrary or capricious standard. See 
Marsh, 109 S. Ct. at 1861 n.23 (there is little practical difference between the "arbitrary or 
capricious" or "reasonableness" standards of review under NEPA). 
25 See, e.g., Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677,681-82,693-94 (9th Cir. 1974) (court upheld 
injunction prohibiting acquisition of land for highway until a proper EIS was prepared and 
circulated). 
26 Compare Baltimore Gas & Elec., 462 U.S. at 97-98 ("The role of the courts is simply to 
ensure that the agency has adequately considered and disclosed the environmental impact of 
its actions and that its decision is not arbitrary or capricious.") with Town of Huntington v. 
Marsh, 859 F.2d 1134, 1143 (2d Cir. 1988) (lack of sufficient data in the EIS violated NEPA). 
27 See Note, EIS Supplements for Improperly Completed Projects: A Logical Extension 
of Judicial Review Under NEPA, 81 MICH. L. REV. 221, 228 (1982). 
28 See, e.g., City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 634 F.2d 347, 348 (6th Cir. 1980) 
("Plaintiffs did not file a motion in this court or in the District Court for an injunction pending 
appeal. During the time that this appeal has been pending, the runway in question has been 
completed."). 
29 Neighbors Organized To Insure A Sound Environment, Inc. v. McArtor, 878 F.2d 174, 
177-78 (6th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff's complaint about the inadequacy of the EIS was dismissed 
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completed, NEP A does not offer a remedy if an agency deviates 
from its proposed plan. 30 
A court may enjoin agency action if the scope of an EIS is too 
narrow. 31 To illustrate, if a proposed action ultimately will destroy 
a forest, an agency does not fulfill its NEP A obligations by disclosing 
in mUltiple EISs the limited effects of removing single trees. This 
type of narrow disclosure is known as "segmentation," and courts 
will halt any attempt to circumvent NEPA by segmenting the proj-
ect. 32 
An agency can defeat a charge of segmentation, however, by 
successfully showing that it could not reasonably have expected the 
size of an initial project to grow. 33 Conflicting opinions exist in situ-
ations involving separate but logically related projects. Courts have 
ruled in some instances that the projects must be included in a single 
EIS and in other instances that an encompassing EIS was not re-
quired.34 
Because the Supreme Court established that NEP A states only 
procedural and not substantive environmental standards, the result-
ing narrow scope of review over the EIS reporting process has 
as moot after airport construction completed and plaintiffs failed to show the government 
capable of repeating the harm). For a case with parallel facts and holding, see City of Romulus, 
634 F.2d at 347. 
30 See, e.g., Ogunquit Village Corp. v. Davis, 553 F.2d 243,246 (1st Cir. 1977) (absent "bad 
faith" on the part of the agency, the court would not fashion relief for a completed project 
that deviated from the final EIS);see also City of Blue Ash v. McLucas, 596 F.2d 709 (6th 
Cir. 1979). Blue Ash involved a dispute between neighboring municipalities and the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA). The city of Blue Ash initially opposed construction of a 4000-
foot runway at an airport located within its city limits but owned by the city of Cincinnati. 
[d. at 710. By a resolution of its city council, Blue Ash eventually dropped opposition to the 
runway in exchange for assurances that jet aircraft would be prohibited from using the airport. 
[d. at 710-11. Subsequently, the Cincinnati city council and the regional airport authority 
adopted resolutions agreeing to follow Blue Ash's stipUlation to prohibit jets. [d. at 711. 
The FAA's final EIS for the airport project recognized the existence of these resolutions. 
[d. Upon completion of the runway, however, the FAA's regulations for the airport permitted 
the use of jet aircraft. [d. When the plaintiff tried to force the FAA to change its regulations 
to reflect the language in the EIS, the court upheld the dismissal of the suit for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. [d. at 713. 
31 Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307, 1322 (9th Cir. 1988). 
32 Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 859 F.2d 1134, 1142 (2d Cir. 1988). 
33 See, e.g., Aertsen v. Landrieu, 488 F. Supp. 314 (D. Mass. 1980), aff'd, 637 F.2d 12, 19 
(1980) (an agency reasonably expected not to have further funding, and therefore, it was not 
acting in bad faith when it sought to demolish additional structures). 
34 Compare Sylvester v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 871 F.2d 817,823 (9th Cir. 
1989) (a golf course built on wetlands differed from an adjoining private resort and did not 
have to be included on the same EIS) with Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 761 (9th Cir. 
1985) (agency's EIS had to consider both a federal road and the federal timber sales that the 
road would facilitate). 
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provided limited opportunities for plaintiffs to prevent environmen-
tal harms. Unless plaintiffs can meet the heavy burden of showing 
capriciousness on the part of a federal agency, courts will defer to 
the agency's expertise on issues of fact.35 As their only remaining 
recourse under NEPA, plaintiffs temporarily halt projects with at-
tacks on the thoroughness or scope of EISs, with the hope that the 
revised EISs will reveal environmental consequences too detrimen-
tal to permit implementation. 36 
In light of this narrow scope of review, plaintiffs should explore 
alternative ways to use the EIS reporting process to prevent envi-
ronmental harms. Instead of litigating to halt a project, plaintiffs 
should seek a judgment that permanently mitigates environmental 
consequences. Using a consent decree to fashion a judgment is one 
way of achieving this goal. 
III. CONSENT DECREES AND FEDERAL AGENCIES 
A consent decree gives parties greater autonomy in fashioning the 
outcome of litigation. Consent decrees are written by the parties, 
much like a contract,37 and are presented to the court for approval 
during the litigation. 38 Unlike a contract, however, if a party should 
fail to abide by the terms of a consent decree, the injured party does 
not initiate a new lawsuit for breach. Instead, the injured party may 
move to have the violating party held in contempt. 39 
. This procedural difference allows faster relief. With a consent 
decree the court maintains jurisdiction over the case, allowing an 
aggrieved party to dispense with the pleading and notice require-
ments of a new suit. 40 An immediate contempt citation, rather than 
the threat of a future lawsuit for breach of contract, gives greater 
incentive to a violating party to abide by the terms of the agreement. 
The increasing number of lawsuits against federal agencies places 
pressure upon the government to settle claims and avoid litigation. 41 
35 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
36 See supra notes 9, 20 and accompanying text. 
37 United States v. ITr Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236 n.10 (1975). 
38 See United States v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 430 F. Supp. 83, 84 (D. Alaska 1977) (plaintiff 
simultaneously filed a complaint and a consent decree that had been negotiated with defen-
dant). 
39 United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 439-40 (5th Cir. 1981). 
40 Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 523-24 n.13 
(1986). 
41 Rabkin & Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits on 
the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REV. 203, 203-07 
(1988). 
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Federal agencies have used consent decrees to settle civil rights 
litigation42 and antitrust actions. 43 Other agencies have entered into 
consent decrees governing the use of land that have defined the 
bounds of subsequent NEPA litigation. 44 
A. Judicial Approval 
Generally, courts are faced with two questions when presented 
with a consent decree. The first is whether to approve of the decree, 
and the second is how to interpret the terms of the decree in a 
proceeding for enforcement. 45 In Local Number 93, International 
Association o/Firefighters v. City o/Cleveland,46 the Supreme Court 
recently examined the ability of a district court to approve of a 
consent decree in the context of a Title VII anti-discrimination suit.47 
In upholding the validity of the decree between a group of minority 
firefighters and the City of Cleveland, the Court discussed how a 
consent decree provided the parties greater flexibility in fashioning 
relief under a federal statute. 48 
As a general requirement, a consent decree must be within the 
court's subject matter jurisdiction.49 Accordingly, the decree must 
not reach beyond the general scope of the pleadings, and it must 
"further the objectives of the law" cited in the complaint. 50 A court 
42 See, e.g., Local No. 93, 478 U.S. 501 (consent decree settling claims against the Cleveland 
fire department for race discrimination). 
43 See, e.g., United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223 (1975) (consent 
decree prohibiting ITT Continental from acquiring a bakery company); United States v. 
Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673 (1971) (consent decree prohibiting Armour from entering retail 
food business). 
44 Conservation Law Found. of New England v. General Servs. Admin., 707 F.2d 626, 629 
(1st Cir. 1983) (disposal of surplus property pursuant to a consent decree); Cummington 
Preservation Comm'n v. Federal Aviation Admin., 524 F.2d 241, 242 n.1 (1st Cir. 1975) (EIS 
resulted from an earlier consent decree); Wicker Park Historic Dist. Preservation Found. v. 
Pierce, 565 F. Supp. 1066, 1068 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (housing development subject to geographic 
limitations of prior consent decree). 
46 Mengler, Consent Decree Paradigms: Models Without Meaning, 29 B.C.L. REV. 291, 
294 (1988). 
46 478 U.S. 501 (1986). 
47 [d. at 514-15. 
48 [d. at 518. "[T]here is no reason to think that voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action 
. . . is rendered impermissible by Title VII simply because it is incorporated into a consent 
decree." [d. "[T]he parties' consent animates the legal force of a consent decree. Therefore, 
a federal court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree merely because the 
decree provides broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial." [d. at 525 
(citations omitted). 
4. [d. 
50 [d. 
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cannot enter a consent decree unless both parties agree to be 
bound. 51 In a multiple-party suit, with plaintiff or defendant inter-
venors, a court can enter a consent decree over the objections of the 
intervenors. 52 Those opposed to the decree will be free to litigate 
their claims. 53 
If a consent decree governs the use of land, however, successors 
in title may be bound by its terms even though they were not original 
parties to the decree. In Cleveland Baptist Association v. Scovil, 54 
owners of lots that were subject to a default proceeding entered into 
a consent decree that restricted the use of their land. 55 By the terms 
of the decree, the lots were to be sold subject to the restrictions set 
forth in the consent decree. 56 The court held that the decree was a 
valid mechanism for encumbering the land, and that by accepting a 
deed incorporating its terms, subsequent owners were bound by the 
decree. 57 
One of the more significant aspects of the Supreme Court's ruling 
in Local Number 93 is that a federal court can approve of a consent 
decree that provides for broader relief than the court normally would 
have the power to award. 58 The Court approved a consent decree 
that gave promotions to individuals who had not been the actual 
victims of discriminatory practice. 59 Although Title VII appears to 
prohibit such a remedy,60 the Court stated that it need not address 
the Title's prohibition in this case because the powers of the court 
were not coming from the law cited in the complaint, but from the 
"obligations embodied in a consent decree. "61 
Writing separately, Justices White and Rehnquist argued that the 
Court could not enter the decree. Justice White believed that the 
51 Id. at 521-22. 
52 Id. at 528-29. 
53 Id. at 528--30. 
54 107 Ohio St. 67, 140 N.E. 647 (1923). 
55 Id. at 68-69, 140 N.E. at 648. 
56 Id. at 69, 140 N.E. at 648. 
57 Id. at 70, 140 N.E. at 649. 
58 Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525-26 (1986). 
59 Id. at 525. 
60 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). "No order of the court shall require ... promotion of an 
individual . . . if such individual was refused . . . advancement . . . for any reason other than 
discrimination .... " Id. The Court held that for purposes of section 2000e-5(g), limitations 
placed on federal courts "do not apply when the obligations are created by a consent decree." 
Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 522-23. 
61 Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 522-23. In a companion case, the Court decided that in some 
circumstances a court may provide relief to individuals who were not actual victims of dis-
criminatory practices. Local 20, of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n. v. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Comm'n, 478 U.S. 421 (1986). 
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substantive terms of the decree, or any form of hiring quotas, vio-
lated Title VII, and therefore, a court could not approve of a settle-
ment that violated the law. 62 Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief 
Justice Burger, argued that the local union, which did not enter into 
the decree, would be bound unjustly by its terms. 63 Under the terms 
of the decree, non-minority union members would be passed over 
for promotions to which they might otherwise be entitled. 64 After a 
review of the legislative history, Justice Rehnquist also concluded 
that, regardless of the parties' consent, entering a decree still fell 
within the prohibitive language of the act. 65 
To settle lawsuits, federal agencies have limited some of their 
discretionary powers in consent decrees. 66 Critics question to what 
extent a federal court, established under article three of the Con-
stitution,67 can approve of self-imposed limits on executive powers68 
contained in a consent decree. 69 In Citizens For A Better Environ-
ment v. Gorsuch,70 the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia held that an agency legitimately may exercise its 
broad powers by agreeing to limit some of its enforcement discretion 
through a consent decree. 71 
In Citizens For A Better Environment, the court held that EPA 
could settle a lawsuit with the Natural Resources Defense Council 
by promulgating additional regulations on the discharge of toxic 
pollutants not normally required under the Clean Water Act.72 Sev-
eral companies, representing steel, chemical, and public utility in-
terests, intervened and petitioned the court to vacate the decree. 73 
The intervenors claimed that the terms of the decree impermissibly 
62 Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 532 (White, J., dissenting). 
63 Id. at 537 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 544 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
66 See, e.g., Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007, 1010 (7th Cir. 
1984) (enforcement of an earlier consent decree in which the FBI agreed to limit its surveillance 
activities); National Audubon Soc'y v. Watt, 678 F.2d 299,302-03 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (petitioners 
challenged the government's compliance with a consent decree in which the Interior Depart-
ment agreed to halt construction until Congress reauthorized the project or an alternative 
plan). 
67 United States Constitution article three, section one states: "The judicial Power of the 
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." 
68 United States Constitution article two, section one states: "The executive Power shall 
be vested in a President of the United States of America." 
69 See Rabkin & Devins, supra note 41, at 228-46. 
70 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984). 
71 Id. at 1129--30. 
72 Id. at 1120-21, 1127-29. 
73 I d. at 1120-21. 
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infringed on the EPA administrator's statutory discretion by shut-
ting out alternative courses of action allowed by the Clean Water 
Act.74 The court rejected the companies' claim, however, and found 
that the actions of EPA were a legitimate pursuit of its statutory 
mandate. 75 The court reiterated that the agency was free to adopt 
more restrictive policies as long as it properly fulfilled its statutory 
obligations. 76 
Critics point out that this type of decree commits an agency to 
spend money on projects devoted to parties bringing suit instead of 
where it might be used most economically.77 They criticize these 
decrees as binding successor administrations, and violating the sep-
aration of powers principle of governance by judicially consenting to 
an intrusion on executive discretion. 78 While cognizant of the consti-
tutional limitations of consent decrees, courts purposefully have 
avoided constitutional questions by limiting decrees on other 
grounds. 79 
B. Interpretation: Contract or Judicial Act 
The Supreme Court has provided conflicting guidelines for inter-
pretation of consent decrees. In one case, the Court required that 
any interpretation of a decree be limited to the "four corners" of the 
consent decree itself.80 The Court strictly interpreted the decree as 
a contract that could not be modified without mutual consent of the 
parties. In a later case, however, the Supreme Court held that a 
court could look to outside sources such as statutes, complaints, and 
other documents in order to interpret a consent decree. 81 Although 
74 [d. at 1122. 
75 [d. at 1129. 
76 See id. 
77 [d. at 1133-34 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Cf United States v. Board of Educ., 744 F.2d 
1300, 1301, 1305-07 (7th Cir. 1984), em. denied, 471 U.S. 1116 (1985) (court ruled that efforts 
by the United States government to secure over $14 million in desegregation funding on a 
"priority basis" fulfilled its obligation under an earlier consent decree). The earlier consent 
decree in Board of Educ. has been criticized as an effort by the Carter Administration to 
settle political disputes prior to the 1980 election. See Rabkin & Devins, supra note 41, at 
270. 
78 Citizens for a Better Env't v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 11~6 (D.C. Cir. 1983), em. 
denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984) (Wilkey, J., dissenting); Rabkin & Devins, supra note 41, at 
24~3. 
79 See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. Watt, 678 F.2d 299, 306 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (instead 
of addressing constitutional questions, the court read into the decree an implied condition 
releasing the parties from their obligations). 
80 United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 680-82 (1971). 
81 United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 238-41 (1975). 
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the Court still called the decree a contract because the decree also 
represented a judicial act, the Court seemed more receptive to a 
broader interpretation. These differing interpretations give lower 
courts greater discretion when reviewing a consent decree in an 
action for enforcement. 82 
In United States v. Armour & CO.,83 the Supreme Court inter-
preted a consent decree between meat packers and the federal gov-
ernment. 84 The decree strictly prohibited Armour from entering the 
retail food business. 85 The government's position was that the decree 
required a complete separation between Armour and the retail food 
market. 86 The Court disagreed and held that the terms of the decree 
expressly did not prohibit a corporation already in the retail food 
business from acquiring Armour as a subsidiary. 87 
The Court stated that the government could petition the original 
court granting the decree and argue that unforeseen circumstances 
required modification to prevent the reoccurrence of old "evils."88 
Unilateral modification by the original court would be possible be-
cause a court is free to modify the terms of a consent decree to 
conform with changes in either the law or factual circumstances 
under which the decree originally was written. 89 Under the existing 
terms of the decree in Armour, however, the Court refused to 
enforce a broader interpretation of complete separation. 90 
Contrary to its holding in Armour, in United States v. ITT Con-
tinental Baking CO.,91 the Supreme Court extended the terms of an 
antitrust consent decree, entered into by the Federal Trade Com-
mission, with no prior change in the law or factual circumstances. 
The Court held that the penalty listed in the decree for acquiring a 
bakery company extended beyond the initial acquisition and repeat-
82 See Mengler, supra note 45, at 299--305. Mengler argues that in regard to the interpre-
tation of consent decrees, the Supreme Court has "charted all the possibilities and fixed its 
sights on none." Id. at 299--300. 
83 402 U.S. 673 (1971). 
84 The consent decree, dating back to 1920, was the result of a bill in equity filed by the 
United States against the country's five largest meat packers. The bill accused the packers of 
conspiring to monopolize the meat business and attempting to control other food markets 
through the use of exclusive output contracts and predatory pricing. Id. at 675. 
85 I d. at 678. 
86 Id. 
S7 Id. at 678-80. 
88 Id. at 680-82. 
88 System Fed'n No. 91, Ry. Employees' Dep't v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642,647 (1960). 
00 United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971). 
91 420 U.S. 223 (1975). 
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edly was incurred by ITT for each day it held the company.92 The 
Court, justifying its interpretation, stated that it remained within 
the "four corners" of the decree because the decree itself authorized 
a broader interpretation.93 The decree stated that "[t]he complaint 
may be used in construing the terms of the [consent] order."94 The 
Court held that this clause allowed it to read the decree in light of 
the antitrust statute under which the case arose and interpret "ac-
quisition" to have a broader meaning. 95 Regardless of the justifica-
tion, the Court readily adopted a broader interpretation of the decree 
to conform to statutory objectives. 
Local No. 93, Armour, and ITT illustrate how a consent decree 
can provide flexibility in framing the judgment in a lawsuit. In 
addition, if a decree furthers the objective of the law, it can provide 
remedies to the consenting parties that the court could not award 
absent such a decree. A court may interpret a decree strictly or with 
greater deference to the policies or law on which it is based, but 
under either interpretation it retains jurisdiction to ensure compli-
ance. 
Consent decrees may offer an alternative in NEP A litigation. 
Concerned environmentalists still would be required to file a lawsuit 
attacking the EIS. Instead of litigating to halt the project tempo-
rarily, however, environmentalists could attempt to mitigate or pre-
clude some adverse environmental consequences by making them 
the subject of a consent decree. In order to understand further how 
a consent decree might mitigate environmental effects, it is neces-
sary to examine how such effects are treated in an EIS. 
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS IN AN EIS 
A. Preclusion of Environmental Consequences 
An EIS must discuss ways to mitigate adverse environmental 
consequences.96 In doing so, the EIS must identify and discuss the 
92 [d. at 240-43. 
93 [d. at 238. 
94 [d. (quoting the decree). 
95 [d. at 241-43. The Court read "complaint" to refer to the earlier charges of monopolistic 
practices by ITT. The history of these practices, detailed in a separate appendix, was incor-
porated into the decree by reference. [d. at 238. The Court further noted: 
Where parties in one agreement include both a consent order and an explanation of 
that order, and also provide that the complaint is to be used to construe the order, 
it seems logical to conclude that, at least as to interpretations not precluded by the 
words of the order itself, the collateral documents can and should be used to give 
meaning to the words of the order. 
[d. at 238-39 n.12. 
96 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(f) (1989). 
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direct and indirect effects of the proposed action. 97 There is little 
dispute that mitigation of these effects must be discussed in an E IS. 98 
NEPA's "reasonableness" standard of judicial review,99 however, has 
resulted in conflicting answers to the question of whether a discus-
sion of indirect effects in an EIS is sufficient in scope. 1OO 
In contrast to the question of sufficiency in scope, the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consistently has stated that possible 
environmental effects do not require preparation of an EIS if an 
agency can preclude their occurrence by withholding development 
rightS. 101 In addition to preclusive measures taken by an agency, 
existing legislation or a prior consent decree also can prevent the 
occurrence of detrimental effects and obviate some of the need for 
an EIS.102 
1. Agency Preclusion 
By withholding certain development permits, an agency was able 
to avoid preparation of an EIS in Conner v. Burford. l03 In Conner, 
the plaintiffs challenged the sale of oil and gas exploration leases by 
the Bureau of Land Management. The leases were for land within 
the Gallatin and Flathead National Forests of Montana. l04 The 
United States Forest Service concluded that sale of exploration 
leases would have no significant impact on the human environment 
and thus did not require an EIS.105 Plaintiffs contended that sale of 
the exploration leases would lead to future mining activities that 
required discussion in an EIS.l06 
97 [d. § 1502. 16(a)-(b). Direct effects occur at the same time and place as the proposed 
action. [d. § 1508.8(a). Indirect effects, however, are removed farther in time or distance from 
the proposed action, but are still "reasonably foreseeable." [d. § 1508.8(b). 
98 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 109 S. Ct. 1835, 1846 (1989) ("To be 
sure, one important ingredient of an EIS is the discussion of steps that can be taken to 
mitigate adverse environmental consequences."). 
99 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
100 See, e.g., Duck River Preservation Ass'n v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 410 F. Supp 758, 
763-65 (E.D. Tenn. 1974), a/I'd, 529 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1976) (the court found that the EIS 
for a dam project adequately disclosed the effects on water quality and wildlife, but did not 
sufficiently disclose the effects on agriculture and the costs of relocating displaced families). 
101 See, e.g., Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 
S. Ct. 1121 (1989) (agency allowed to grant oil exploration leases without EIS because the 
leases prohibited "surface-disturbing activity"). 
102 Kilroy v. Ruckelshaus, 738 F.2d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1984). 
103 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1121 (1989). 
104 [d. at 1443. 
105 [d. 
106 See id. at 1444. 
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The plaintiffs prevailed in district court,107 but on appeal the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that an EIS was not required 
in every instance where a lease was sold.108 The court noted that 
some of the leases were sold with "No Surface Occupancy" (NSO) 
stipulations. These stipulations prevented the lessee from occupying 
or using the surface of the land without further government ap-
proval. 109 The court interpreted NEPA to require an EIS only when 
the government "irretrievably" commits to a use of resources. 110 The 
court further said that if the government should modify the leases 
or remove the NSO stipulations, then it would have to prepare an 
EIS.l11 
In Northern Plains Resource Council v. Lujan,112 the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed Conner and held that an EIS 
was not required to analyze the effects of the possibility of a future 
fuel plant because issuance of a coal lease created no right to con-
struct the plant.113 If a plant was authorized later, then the need for 
an EIS would be considered at that date.l14 The Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia has used an identical test to determine 
whether preclusion of environmental consequences by an agency 
obviates the need for an EIS. The court held that the Department 
of the Interior could delay preparation of an EIS as long as it 
retained the authority to preclude all activities until submission of 
specific proposals, and to prevent any activities with unacceptable 
environmental consequences. 115 
2. Legislative or Consent Decree Preclusion 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also has held that 
existing legislation and a prior consent decree can obviate the need 
107 [d. The district court opinion is reported in Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. 
Mont. 1985). 
los Conner, 848 F.2d at 1447-51. 
109 [d. at 1444. 
110 [d. at 1446. 
[A]ll agencies of the Federal Government shall ... (C) include in every recommen-
dation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the 
responsible official on ... (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of 
resOl{rces which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(v) (1982). 
III Conner, 848 F.2d at 1447-48. 
112 874 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1989). 
IlS [d. at 666. 
ll' [d. 
115 Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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for discussion of consequences in an EIS.116 In holding that an EIS 
need not discuss the continued effects of sewage discharge into 
marine waters, the court noted that congressional amendments to 
the Clean Water Act prohibited renewal of the permit under which 
the current discharge was occurring.ll7 The court weighed the like-
lihood of changes occurring in the prohibitive legislation and con-
ceded that the congressional act was more likely to change than laws 
"as impregnable as the antitrust laws. "118 Nevertheless, it found that 
the Act made renewed discharge a remote possibility.119 To buttress 
its argument, the court noted that the city discharging the waste 
had entered into a consent decree in which it agreed to stop the 
discharge by a certain date. 120 
An agency cannot permanently withhold permits authorizing ac-
tion that might harm the environment in every project and expect 
to accomplish its goals. Nor will legislation always be able to preclude 
detrimental environmental effects.121 At some point, detrimental ef-
fects must be addressed in an EIS. A key component in an EIS is 
the discussion of how these effects are to be mitigated. 
B. Mitigation of Environmental Effects 
In Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,122 the Supreme 
Court recently reaffirmed that an EIS must discuss ways to mitigate 
adverse environmental consequences in order to comply with 
NEPA.123 The Court read this requirement from the language of the 
Actl24 and the regulations promulgated thereunder. 125 The Court 
stated, however, that the requirement to discuss mitigating mea-
sures did not mean that the agency had to implement and adopt a 
mitigation plan. 126 
116 Kilroy v. Ruckelshaus, 738 F.2d 1448, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1984). 
117 [d. 
118 [d. at 1454. 
119 [d. 
120 [d. at 1453-54. 
121 See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
122 109 S. Ct. 1835 (1989). 
123 [d. at 1846. 
124 "[A]II agencies of the Federal Government shall ... (C) include in every recommendation 
. . . a detailed statement by the responsible official on . . . (ii) any adverse environmental 
effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented .... " 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(2)(C)(ii) (1982). 
125 "[The EIS] shall include discussions of: ... (h) Means to mitigate adverse environmental 
impacts .... " 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16 (1989). 
126 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 109 S. Ct. 1835, 1847 (1989). 
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The dispute in Robertson arose when the Forest Service decided 
to issue a permit authorizing the development of a ski resort on 
federal lands in Washington. 127 Prior to issuing the permit, the For-
est Service, in cooperation with state and local officials, compiled an 
EIS.l28 In the EIS, the Forest Service extensively discussed the 
proposed project's adverse environmental impacts on air quality and 
wildlife. 129 The study paid particular attention to the cumulative 
impacts of development on private and other non-federal lands sur-
rounding the ski resort. 130 
The Forest Service concluded that the off-site cumulative impacts 
of private development could affect the environment significantly 
and detrimentally.131 To mitigate these impacts, the EIS recom-
mended that the surrounding county adopt an air-quality manage-
ment plan. 132 The Forest Service also recommended ways to limit 
interference with mule deer migration routes and ways to minimize 
the expected reduction in herd. l33 Federal, state, and county officials 
entered into a memorandum of understanding assigning responsibil-
ities for these various mitigation tasks. l34 The study emphasized, 
however, that an accurate assessment of off-site effects would be 
difficult to determine due to the uncertain consequences of private 
development. 135 
Plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that the mitigation steps discussed 
in the EIS were insufficient to comply adequately with NEPA.136 
127 Id. at 1839. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 1840. 
130 "The burning of wood for space heat ... would constitute the primary cause of diminished 
air quality .... [W]ithout efforts to mitigate these effects ... the increase in automobile, 
fireplace, and wood stove use would reduce air quality below state standards .... " Id. (citing 
the EIS). U[T]he ultimate impact on the Methow deer herd could exceed a 50 percent reduction 
in numbers." Id. at 1841 (quoting a comment to the draft EIS by the Washington State 
Department of Game). 
131 Id. at 1840, 1842. 
132 Id. at 1841. Some of the recommendations included: uDevelop[ing] land use codes 
specifically addressing side development and project design directed at energy efficiency and 
air pollution control ... [r]estricting the number of fireplaces and wood stoves ... 
[e]ncouraging the use of alternative, non-polluting energy sources .... " Id. at 1841 n.5 
(quoting the EIS). 
133 Id. at 1842-43. Options for minimizing the impact on the Methow mule deer herd 
discussed in the EIS included: "the use of zoning and tax incentives to limit development on 
deer winter range and migration routes, encouragement of conservation easements, and 
acquisition and management by local government of critical tracts of land." I d. at 1842 (citing 
the EIS). 
134 Id. at 1847 n.16. 
135 Id. at 1842. 
136 Id. at 1843-44, 1847. 
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While the Supreme Court conceded that "omission of a reasonably 
complete discussion of possible mitigation measures [would] under-
mine the 'action-forcing' function of NEPA,"137 the Court stated that 
a requirement to discuss mitigation of environmental consequences 
did not extend to implementation of a formal mitigation plan. l38 The 
Court also stated that it would be incongruous to require the Forest 
Service to proceed any further in a mitigation plan because most of 
the territories in question were outside .the Forest Service's con-
trol.139 Because many federal projects spur off-site development that 
creates effects beyond the agency's control, disputes will continue 
to arise as to the reasonableness of EIS mitigation discussions. 14o 
V. PRECLUSION OF ADVERSE EFFECTS AND SUPPLEMENTAL 
REPORTING THROUGH CONSENT DECREE 
A. Proposed Model or Scenario 
In many of the NEP A cases there are three types of interested 
parties, not all of which may be named in the suit: a federal agency 
proposing an action; an environmental plaintiff opposing the pro-
posed action; and a private party, state agency, or municipal corpo-
ration backing the action.141 The Robertson142 case fits such a scen-
ario. In Robertson, the agency was the Forest Service, which had 
proposed to issue a permit for the development of ski areas on federal 
lands. 143 The environmental plaintiffs opposed to issuance of the 
137 Id. at 1846-47. 
138 Id. at 1847. 
139 Id. 
140 See, e.g., Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467, 480 (9th Cir. 1979) (agency's EIS had 
to consider the supply of federal power and the construction of an aluminum reduction plant 
that used the power); Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425, 1433--34 
(C.D. Cal. 1985) (river bank stabilization project and private housing built as a result had to 
be considered in the same EIS). 
141 See, e.g., Missouri Coalition for the Env't v. Corps of Eng'rs, 866 F.2d 1025, 1027-29 
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 76 (1989) (environmentalists challenged a decision by the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to forego preparation of an EIS before granting a permit to 
a private developer to fill a wetland); National Resources Defense Council v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 
288, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (petitioners claimed that the Interior Department, which was 
supported by the American Petroleum Institute as intervenors, did not adequately consider 
the effects of its continental shelf leasing program on migratory species); Bob Marshall Alliance 
v. Hodel, 852 F.2d 1223, 1224-26 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1350 (1989) (envi-
ronmentalists sued the Forest Service and lessees over the issuance of oil and gas exploration 
leases without preparation of an EIS). 
142 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 109 S. Ct. 1835 (1989). 
143 Id. at 1839. 
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permit under the current EIS were composed of citizens groups 
concerned about the proposed development's effects on air quality 
and wildlife. 144 The private party that supported the government 
action was Methow Recreation, Inc., an applicant for the develop-
ment permit. 145 The state of Washington and the local county, though 
not parties to the suit, cooperated in preparing the EIS.146 This 
scenario will help to explain how a consent decree could reduce some 
of the NEPA litigation arising under similar circumstances, and how 
a decree could help to mitigate adverse environmental consequences. 
A consent decree would serve two major functions: precluding 
harmful effects of the proposed action, and establishing supplemental 
reporting requirements for the federal agency to prevent deviation 
from the terms of the EIS. Preclusion of harmful effects could be 
achieved if developers would submit to land use restrictions or if 
municipalities would pass legislation taking preemptive action. 147 
Once these effects are precluded, the federal agency would not have 
to discuss ways to mitigate them in an EIS.I48 With fewer effects to 
consider, the resources spent writing a broad EIS could be focused 
on developing mitigation alternatives for other effects that cannot 
be precluded. 
In return for submitting to restrictions, pro-development parties 
would be rewarded with a more streamlined NEPA process and 
faster completion of the project. In the consent decree, environmen-
talists would forgo their right to sue, but could continue to monitor 
the sufficiency of the EIS and progress of the project under the EIS 
through supplemental reporting. 149 
The consent decree should include all involved parties. If major 
litigants do not wish to sign a consent decree, then the option is not 
viable. Their absence would undermine the decree's effectiveness in 
mitigating environmental harm and limiting future litigation. Absent 
parties would not be bound by the terms of the decree and would 
144 Id. at 1843 n.11. 
145 Id. at 1839. 
146 Id. 
147 See supra notes 116-120 and accompanying text. 
148 See supra notes 116-120 and accompanying text. 
149 See Huffman, The Opportunities for Environmentalists in the Settlement of NEPA 
Suits, 4 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl L. Inst.) 50,001 (1974). The author examined a settlement 
reached in a NEP A lawsuit with a municipal agency in which plaintiffs were permitted to 
appoint members to a committee charged with overseeing preparation of an EIS. Id. at 50,005. 
Plaintiffs, however, did not waive their right to bring a new action based upon alleged 
insufficiency in the final EIS. Id. at 50,006. 
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be free to litigate independent claims.150 If third parties who are 
merely ancillary to the litigation are opposed to the decree, however, 
then the major parties may wish to sign a consent decree without 
them. If the major parties equitably resolve significant environmen-
tal issues in a consent decree, they could be reasonably assured that 
a court would rule that outstanding complaints of minor parties were 
without merit. 151 
B. Preclusion of Indirect Consequences 
To illustrate preclusion of indirect consequences by consent de-
cree, it is helpful to examine one concern of the parties in Robertson. 
There, the cumulative impacts on air quality of increased private 
development around the ski resort were at issue. The EIS examined 
the adverse environmental impact on air quality at each of five levels 
of development and proposed a variety of alternatives for mitigating 
these effects.152 One proposal restricted the number of wood-burning 
fireplaces for tourist use. 153 The study recommended implementation 
of this restriction and many others through development of a county-
wide Air Quality Control Authority. 154 
Environmental groups believed that they could not rely on imple-
mentation of these recommendations to mitigate air pollution and 
brought suit challenging the sufficiency of the EIS. The Supreme 
Court held that the EIS need only list mitigating programs and that 
the EIS provided no cause of action to force program implementa-
tion, especially when most of the programs were in the control of 
third parties. 155 
The environmentalists' goals of mitigating harmful effects could 
better be accomplished in a similar situation with a consent decree. 
In a decree, the county could consent to passing land use codes 
150 See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text. 
151 See United States v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 430 F. Supp. 83 (D. Alaska 1977). The court 
approved of a consent decree, governing effluent discharge under the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, over the objections of environmentalist intervenors. [d. at 85. After reviewing 
the intervenors' objections and finding them without merit, the court noted that "the decree 
precludes further suits for the specific violations alleged herein." [d. at 87. The court further 
stated, however, that "[the decree] does not ... preclude citizens suits for different violations 
nor does it attempt to preclude citizens suits to force EPA to enforce the decree." [d. 
152 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 109 S. Ct. 1835, 1840-41 (1989). 
153 [d. at 1841 n.5. 
164 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
155 Robertson, 109 S. Ct. at 1847. 
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significantly restricting fireplaces for tourist use. Private parties 
could impose these restrictions on their land voluntarily with the 
intention of binding subsequent purchasers. 156 As a result, the 
agency involved would not have to analyze the effects of fireplaces 
at each of five levels of development because the consequences would 
have been precluded. 157 In return, the environmentalists would not 
contest the absence of this provision in the EIS or other provisions 
they found less objectionable. Environmentalists could rely on the 
contractual provisions of a consent decree, instead of non-binding 
statements in an EIS, to ensure that the third parties implemented 
these mitigating measures. 158 
A consent decree also could help to ensure mitigation of adverse 
environmental consequences within an agency's control. For exam-
ple, the development and construction of airports frequently be-
comes the subject of NEPA litigation. 159 Although airport construc-
tion may seem different from ski resort development, the parties in 
the litigation play similar roles. One case that typifies NEP A liti-
gation and is suitable for resolution by consent decree is City of Blue 
Ash v. McLucas. 160 In Blue Ash, an agreement consisting of joint 
resolutions of two municipalities prohibiting jet aircraft from using 
a runway was incorporated into an EIS. The court held, however, 
that the agreement did not prevent an action by the federal agency 
that deviated from its terms because the federal agency was not a 
party to the agreement. 161 
156 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. Without economic incentive, private 
parties voluntarily will not impose restrictions upon their land. For a discussion of the economic 
incentive for developers, see infra notes 166-167 and accompanying text. 
157 See supra notes 103-121 and accompanying text. See also Huffman, supra note 149, at 
50,007 (plaintiffs waived NEPA challenges when a utility company agreed to install a "closed-
cycle" cooling system rather than a system that would have discharged heated water into the 
Mississippi). 
158 See Environmental Defense Fund v. Alexander, 554 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Miss. 1981) (in 
a consent decree, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers agreed to halt construction on certain 
projects until 60 days after filing a supplementary EIS with the court). 
159 See, e.g., Neighbors Organized to Insure a Sound Environment v. McArtor, 878 F.2d 
174 (6th Cir. 1989) (plaintiffs challenged the sufficiency of an EIS prepared for new airport 
terminal); City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 634 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1980) (city sued to halt 
construction of a runway); City of Blue Ash v. McLucas, 596 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1979) (city 
brought action against FAA to enforce municipalities' commitments incorporated in an EIS 
for airport project); Runway 27 Coalition v. Engen, 679 F. Supp. 95 (D. Mass. 1987) (residents 
sought preparation of an EIS before airport instituted changes in runway flight patterns). 
160 596 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1979). For a discussion of the facts of this case, see supra note 
30. 
161 I d. at 712. The court suggested that there may be a cause of action under state law 
against the city of Cleveland as the proprietor of the airport. Id. 
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If the municipalities in this suit had entered into a consent decree 
with the FAA to limit the use of the airport, then they probably 
would have succeeded in enforcing the stipulations mentioned in the 
EIS. With a consent decree, the city of Blue Ash would have been 
in a situation similar to that of the plaintiffs in Citizens For A Better 
Environment v. Gorsuch, in which EPA consented to promulgating 
additional regulations not required under the Clean Water Act. 162 
Like the EPA in Citizens For A Better Environment, the FAA could 
agree to promulgate regulations within its authority that reflect the 
prohibitions of the consent decree. 163 As a party to a consent decree, 
the FAA could not later issue contradictory regulations without 
court approval. 164 A decree in this type of situation would give 
environmentalists a better opportunity to enforce mitigating mea-
sures because they could request that a court use its broad remedial 
powers to enforce the decree. 165 
The viability of using a consent decree to preclude harmful envi-
ronmental effects will hinge on the economic importance of the de-
velopment rights being limited under the decree. Private parties are 
not likely to consent to limiting their development rights if the 
resulting restrictions will render their land less profitable. Likewise, 
legislators may find it politically impossible to pass legislation that 
restricts development excessively. When given the option of signing 
a consent decree, the parties will have to weigh the value of the 
rights they may wish to protect against the cost of litigation and the 
increased cost of the project due to delay.166 Developers may find, 
however, that agreeing to limitations in a consent decree is more 
cost-effective than continuing the litigation. 167 
162 See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text. 
163 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
164 See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. 
165 See Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 678 F.2d 470, 478 
(3d Cir.), cen. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982) (a district court has wide discretion in fashioning 
a remedy for civil contempt). In Delaware Valley, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
upheld an order by the district court directing the United States Secretary of Transportation 
to refrain from approving any projects or awarding any grants of federal highway funds until 
Pennsylvania complied with the terms of a consent decree arising under the Clean Air Act. 
Id. at 478-79. 
166 See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (litigation over 
a housing project spanned nine years); Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(litigation over an interstate highway project spanned 16 years). 
167 See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 149, at 50,007. While commenting on a NEPA settlement 
between environmentalists and a public utility company, the author stated: "According to the 
utilities, a closed-cycle system [stipulated in the settlement] cost $19 million more than a 
diffuser discharge pipe system, but, ... the delay in operation between the injunction and 
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C. Supplemental Reporting 
Supplemental reporting requirements could help environmental 
groups to prevent agencies from deviating from the terms of an EIS. 
While a federal agency may not be able to control development on 
surrounding lands, it can control the level of development within the 
proposed project site. The agency, however, may be less willing to 
commit to future restrictions on development in a consent decree. 
Unlike private parties,168 a federal agency would not be as heavily 
influenced by the economic pressures of litigation. 169 In addition, the 
agency could argue that permits authorizing development at the 
current stage of a project require only a limited EIS.170 Given that 
an agency might be reluctant to preclude environmental conse-
quences that have not been authorized, plaintiffs could use a consent 
decree to monitor agency activities more effectively to ensure that 
they remain within the scope of a limited EIS. 
Instead of being forced into litigation at each stage in the permit 
process, the agency could consent to reporting specific information 
to environmental groups, such as construction plans, before issuing 
any further development permits. Supplemental reporting at critical 
stages of the project may seem redundant given that the goal of 
NEPA is public disclosure and reporting.l7l But NEPA represents 
only a statutory minimum of disclosure requirements. 172 In exercis-
ing its discretion on how best to comply with the Act,173 an agency 
could decide that enhanced reporting would save litigation re-
sources. 174 
the date of the agreement had cost them $50 million in lost revenues." See also Davis, A 
NEPA Settlement: Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 5 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 50,079, 50,085 (1975) (the author argues that the financial burden of continuing 
litigation was a factor in the parties' decision to settle). 
168 Because the federal agency is usually the named defendant in a NEPA suit, private 
parties that support development can avoid litigation costs by not intervening. Unless private 
parties join the suit as intervenors, however, their interests may not be represented to their 
satisfaction in a settlement or possible consent decree. 
169 See Huffman, supra note 149, at 50,010 (while a project delay means increased cost to 
the government, the agency receives "interest-free" funds from Congress, and risks congres-
sional "wrath" if it voluntarily halts a project). 
170 The Forest Service in Robertson argued that the action in dispute only involved a 
general development permit, and that further authorization would be required to construct 
any ski resort. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 109 S. Ct. 1835, 1843 (1989). 
The Forest Service further argued that mitigation of air pollution could be addressed later in 
the development process and that the current EIS was adequate. [d. 
171 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982). 
172 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 
U.S. 519, 548 (1978). 
173 See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text. 
17. Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 573 F.2d 
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If a consent decree required supplemental progress reports, an 
environmental group would have a better chance of preventing an 
agency from undertaking actions beyond the scope of an existing 
EIS. Courts have imposed similar requirements on federal agencies 
when retaining jurisdiction in NEPA lawsuits. 175 This compliance 
monitoring decreases the likelihood of a case becoming moot because 
environmental challenges could be more timely.176 
If an agency failed to comply with the reporting requirements or 
any other provisions of the decree, then the courts could provide 
remedial relief. l77 A court would not be reviewing the agency's ac-
tions under the narrow reasonableness standard of the Administra-
tive Procedures Act. 178 Instead, it would be judging compliance to a 
judicial decree. The court justifiably could grant the agency less 
discretion as it operated under the decree. 179 
D. Judicial Approval 
By following the precedent of Local Number 93, International 
Association of Firefighters, 180 a district court could approve a consent 
decree precluding indirect effects and establishing supplemental re-
porting. 181 A consent decree resolving a dispute under NEP A, a 
federal statute, is within a federal court's subject matter jurisdic-
tion. l82 In addition, a decree encouraging disclosure through supple-
mental reporting would further the objectives of NEPA.I83 Preclu-
960, 963 (7th Cir.), eert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978). "[I]t is generally recognized that 
settlements are entered into because of 'the very uncertainties of outcome in litigation, as 
well as the avoidance of wasteful litigation and expense .... m [d. (quoting Florida Trailer & 
Equipment Co. v. Deal, 284 F.2d 567, 571 (5th Cir. 1960)). 
175 Conservation Law Found. v. General Servs. Admin., 427 F. Supp. 1369, 1377 (D.R.1. 
1977) (court retained jurisdiction and ordered progress reports to ensure that the level of 
activity did not change before preparation of an EIS); Citizens for Mass Transit Against 
Freeways v. Brinegar, 357 F. Supp. 1269, 1283 (D. Ariz. 1973) (rather than granting injunction, 
court would retain jurisdiction and require federal and state officials to keep plaintiff informed 
of any impending federal action). 
176 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
177 See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 835--86 (D.D.C. 
1974), a/I'd, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir.), eert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976) (an agency's lack of 
diligence in complying with NEPA regulations prompted the court to order a more site-specific 
EIS). 
178 See supra notes 18--86 and accompanying text. 
179 See Citizens For A Better Env't v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1127-29 (D.C. Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984). 
ISO 478 U.S. 501 (1986). 
181 See supra notes 45-61 and accompanying text. 
182 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." [d. 
183 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). 
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sion of adverse environmental impacts is one method of disclosing 
their existence and ensuring that their consequences are weighed in 
relation to the benefits of the project. 184 A decree would not attempt 
to bind individuals who are not signatories, nor would it grant sig-
natories special benefits at the expense of others. 185 
Although a decree might require reporting that goes beyond NE-
PA's statutory minimum, the increased reporting would be applica-
ble only to the site in question. The increased reporting requirements 
would not apply to other federal projects. Narrowing the scope of a 
decree in this way limits abrogation of executive discretion. A nar-
rower decree could be seen by courts as representing a decision by 
an agency to adopt a more restrictive policy in a particular situa-
tion. 186 
E. Judicial Interpretation 
In addition to approval, courts would have to interpret NEPA 
consent decrees in actions for enforcement. Regardless of whether 
a court interpreted a consent decree as a contract or as a judicial 
act, it would provide the court with greater enforcement powers 
over an agency or a third party by giving the court the ability to 
hold a party in contempt if it failed to abide by the terms of the 
decree. 187 
Either interpretation also would insure that an agency's activities 
do not exceed the bounds of an existing EIS. To modify a decree 
under a strict contract interpretation, the agency would have to 
argue, against a signatory environmentalist's rebuttal, that unfore-
seen circumstances required modification. l88 Under the less restric-
tive interpretation of viewing a decree as a judicial act in light of 
NEPA's procedural goals, a court may alter the supplemental re-
porting requirements to accommodate the needs of the parties in the 
future. A court, however, probably would not permit an agency to 
undertake further development activities without increasing the 
184 See id. § 4331(b)(5). 
185 This rationale supports judicial approval because it answers one of the arguments for 
not approving a consent decree made by the dissent in Local No. 93. See supra notes 62--65 
and accompanying text. 
186 See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text. 
187 See supra notes 39, 164 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Kirkland, 12 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,104 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (court found that defendants violated 
a consent decree by conducting dredge and fill operations, and ordered them to pay a $1000 
fine and to restore the land). 
188 See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. 
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scope of the existing EIS. At its discretion, the agency initially 
limited development to narrow the scope of EIS reporting. There-
fore, a court still would be fulfilling NEPA's procedural goals by 
enjoining development until completion of a broader EIS.189 
Environmental groups have a greater assurance that a decree 
would enforce commitments of non-federal parties effectively be-
cause a federal court constitutionally is not bound to respect the 
discretionary acts of non-federal parties. 190 The consent decree would 
operate more like a contract with modification by mutual consent. 
Third parties would have to convince the court that potential envi-
ronmental consequences would still be precluded if the decree was 
modified to permit greater development. Environmentalists would 
then have an opportunity to challenge these arguments in favor of 
development. Third parties would have the difficult burden of show-
ing why an agreement, which they entered into voluntarily, should 
be modified over the objections of the other signatories. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As a procedural statute, NEP A does not provide a substantive 
basis upon which a party can challenge the environmental conse-
quences of major federal actions. The Act's goal is to ensure that 
the federal government reasonably discloses all the environmental 
consequences of a proposed action so that the value of a proposal 
can be weighed against its environmental costs. An EIS provides no 
cause of action for environmentalists or other concerned citizens, 
however, if an agency deviates from the EIS as it implements a 
proposal. As their only means of recourse, environmental plaintiffs 
attack the adequacy of an EIS in an effort to raise public sentiment 
and to make agencies more responsive to environmental concerns. 
The narrow scope of the arbitrary, capricious, or reasonableness 
standards of judicial review under NEP A limits the chances envi-
ronmentalists may have of protecting environmental concerns by 
ensuring compliance with an EIS. As an alternative to judgment 
granted within a court's limited discretion, parties to NEPA litiga-
tion could write a consent decree that would be subject to court 
approval. The consent decree provides greater flexibility because 
the parties may be able to fashion remedies that would not be 
possible if the court were acting alone. 
189 See supra notes 31-34, 91-95 and accompanying text. 
190 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text. 
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A consent decree could be used to mitigate the adverse environ-
mental impacts of proposed federal action. If private parties agree 
to limit some of their development rights in a consent decree, there 
would be fewer adverse effects to identify and mitigate in an EIS. 
In exchange for limiting development· and reporting activities to 
environmental groups, environmentalists would forgo their right to 
challenge the sufficiency of the EIS. Environmentalists could use 
the NEPA reporting requirements to monitor the progress of the 
project and agency compliance with NEP A. Through use of the 
contempt power, a consent decree would provide courts with greater 
enforcement powers over an agency if the agency failed to abide by 
the terms of the decree. In addition, environmental groups can be 
assured that the decree effectively would enforce the mitigating 
commitments of private parties. 
